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Abstract 
We study a two echelon supply chain with first order autoregressive demand and unit 
replenishment lead-times. Each echelon of the supply chain uses conditional 
expectation to generate Minimum Mean Squared Error (MMSE) forecasts.  Both 
echelons use these forecasts inside the “Order-Up-To” policy to generate replenishment 
orders.  We investigate three different scenarios:  The first is when each echelon aims to 
minimize their own local inventory holding and backlog costs.  The second scenario is 
concerned with an altruistic retailer who is willing and able to sacrifice some of his own 
performance for the benefit of the total supply chain.  The retailer does this by 
smoothing the demand placed on the manufacturer by using a matched proportional 
controller in the inventory and WIP feedback loops.  The third scenario is concerned 
with an altruistic retailer with two, unmatched, controllers. The matched controller case 
out-performs the traditional case by 14.1%; the unmatched controller case outperforms 
the matched controller case by 4.9%. 
Keywords: Supply chains, multi-echelon inventory, order-up-to policy, 
collaboration, co-ordination, altruistic behavior 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
There has been a growing interest in supply chains ever since Christopher (1998) 
argued that it is not individual companies but rather supply chains that compete against 
each other. Assuming the unit of competition is at the supply chain level creates a 
number of interesting challenges as actions in one part of the supply chain will have 
consequences in other parts of supply chain.  This could be in a different company, a 
different industry, or even in another part of the world.  Thus there is a need to 
understand how decisions taken by one member of the supply chain can affect other 
members of the supply chain. Collaboration in and co-ordination of, supply chains is 
therefore an important area of study. 
 
It is often appropriate to consider a supply chain to be a series of decisions. In these 
decisions, demand is observed, forecasts are made, and orders are placed on supplier or 
production facilities so as to replenish inventory positions.  These decisions also have to 
account for the lead-time between placing the order and receipt of that order into stock.  
Thus supply chains are concerned with the upstream flow of information and the 
downstream flow of materials.   
 
It is common to assume a simple linear chain, with one retailer and one manufacturer, 
for example.   This is appropriate in many practical situations, as in divergent supply 
chains (many retailers, one manufacturer), the many retailer demands can simply be 
aggregated into one.  However, in the general case there can be many retailers, many 
manufacturers and a complex and time varying trading relationship between the 
members.  This type of supply chain is very hard to understand and analyse.  Thus we 
focus herein on a simple dyadic supply chain (of one retailer and one manufacturer). 
 
Decision making processes often introduce a dynamic effect in supply chains.  This 
dynamic effect is known as the bullwhip effect after the seminal contribution of Lee, 
Padmanabhan and Whang (1997), who used the term to highlight that the variance of 
the demand was amplified as demand signal was processed by the replenishment 
algorithm.  This bullwhip effect is quite common in industry, as the order-up-to policy 
with unit feedback controllers and simple forecasting techniques (such as moving 
average and exponential smoothing) is guaranteed to amplify demand (Dejonckheere et 
al. (2003).  The economic consequences of the bullwhip are not insignificant.  Metters 
(1997) suggests that factory gate profit could be increased by 30% if bullwhip can be 
removed from a supply chain.  The typical industrial response to combat the bullwhip 
effect has been to reduce lead-times, improve forecasts and to use information sharing.   
Chen, Drezner, Ryan and Simchi-Levi (2000) have elegantly quantified the benefits of 
these strategies in a multi-echelon supply chain scenario.  Another, equally important, 
strategy is to reduce the use of discounting and promotions, via an everyday low pricing 
strategy, Fisher et al. (1997). 
 
Luo (2007) considers a coordination scheme in a two-echelon supply chain consisting 
of a manufacturer and a retailer. It is assumed that a manufacturer can modify the 
retailers order pattern by offering incentives in order to lower total costs. The 
manufacturer asks the retailer to change its order quantity to reduce his own set up, 
ordering and inventory holding costs. To entice the retailer to behave in a manner that is 
advantageous to the manufacturer, a credit period incentive is offered by the 
manufacturer. It is shown that the benefit of the manufacturer is always greater than the 
loss to the retailer.  Thus this cooperation scheme can bring the benefits to overall 
supply chain.  
 
In another two-echelon supply chain scenario Gavirneni (2006) assumes that the 
supplier can alter the pattern of orders placed by the retailer by altering his prices. As 
the result of this incentive, the retailer’s ordering pattern is not locally optimum 
anymore and thus the retailer’s cost increases. However, the benefit to the manufacturer 
is sufficient enough to compensate for the increase at the retailer. With the aid of 
information sharing, the overall supply chain performance can be improved by 5%, on 
average. 
 
Other incentives to encourage the retailer to incur cost increases include quantity 
flexibility (Tsay, 1999), quantity discounts (Weng, 1995), and revenue sharing 
(Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo, 2004).  Cachon and Lariviere (2005) discuss revenue 
sharing contracts and their relationship to other types of contracts in supply chains with 
risk-neutral agents. Gan, Sethi and Yan (2004) investigate decision making by risk 
adverse agents in a supply chain. Cachon (2003) provides a review of supply chain 
coordination mechanisms and emphasises coordination actions and transfer payments 
that ensures each firm’s objective becomes aligned with the supply chain’s objective.  
 
In this paper we suggest a method to reduce supply chain inventory costs by 
coordinating, or aligning, the parameters of replenishment rules.  We consider the case 
of a two echelon supply chain consisting of a retailer and a manufacturer, with one 
product in an environment where only inventory related (holding and backlog) costs 
exist.  For the sake of simplicity these costs are identical at both the retailer and the 
manufacturer.   
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The role of aligning the replenishment rules and their parameters in a multi-echelon 
supply chains has been analysed before. Using a serially linked two-echelon supply 
chain with an AR(1) market demand, Hosoda and Disney (2006b) investigated the 
impact of altruistic behaviour on the overall supply chain inventory holding and backlog 
costs. To realize altruistic behaviour at the retailer, they introduced matched 
proportional controllers into the inventory and Work-In-Progess (WIP) feedback loops 
of the traditional Order-Up-To policy, Vassian (1955). These matched proportional 
controllers enabled the order placed by the retailer to be manipulated to reduce the total 
supply chain inventory cost. It is suggested that altruistic behaviour by the retailer 
mitigates the bullwhip effect, and this lower bullwhip is the source of the benefit at the 
manufacturer. Also, the cost benefit at the manufacturer is large enough to compensate 
the loss at the retailer. It is shown that on average more than 10% cost reduction can be 
achieved in the overall supply chain.  
 
Hosoda (2005) extends the model shown in Hosoda and Disney (2006b) to a three-
echelon case. Using numerical experiments, Hosoda showed that in a three-echelon 
case, not only the first echelon (retailer), but also the second echelon player, has to be 
altruistic to minimise the overall supply chain costs. It is shown that the average cost 
benefit in this setting is around 25%.  
 
Disney et al. (2008) assumed that the market demand follows a stable i.i.d. white noise 
process and investigates the benefit of altruistic behaviour in a serially linked two-
echelon supply chain. Two matched proportional controllers are incorporated into the 
replenishment (ordering) policy and this modified ordering policy was exploited by 
both echelons of the supply chain (the retailer and the manufacturer).  Here the 
objective function included both inventory and bullwhip costs at both echelons of the 
supply chain.  
 
2 CONTRIBUTION OF THIS PAPER 
 
In this paper we will focus on the retailer’s ordering policy that can yield a globally 
minimal supply chain inventory holding and backlog cost irrespective of incentives 
given by the manufacturer. We will use a classical OUT policy with two unmatched 
(that is, independent) proportional controllers in the inventory and WIP feedback loops.  
It is the analysis of the unmatched controllers that makes this paper unique in the 
literature. 
 
Assuming first order autoregressive (AR(1)) demand we study a serially linked two-
echelon supply chain that exploits a generalized order-up-to OUT policy with 
unmatched feedback controllers at the first echelon (the retailer) and a traditional OUT 
policy at the second echelon (the manufacturer). We also assume that Minimum Mean 
Square Error (MMSE) forecasting is used and unit lead-times are present at each 
echelon.  
 
The benefit from the retailer’s altruistic behavior enabled by the generalized OUT 
policy with unmatched feedback controllers will be investigated.  Each player acts to 
minimize global inventory costs.  To quantify its benefit, this strategy will be compared 
with other two strategies; 1) a traditional strategy where each player minimizes local 
inventory costs, Hosoda and Disney (2006a), and 2) an altruistic strategy achieved by 
the generalized OUT policy with matched feedback controllers, Hosoda and Disney 
(2006b).  
 
As an indicator of the supply chain performance, we will employ a metric that consists 
of the sum of the stationary standard deviation of the net inventory levels at each 
echelon. This is a valid approach when safety stock have been optimized via the 
newsvendor principle as inventory costs are then linearly related to the standard 
deviation to the inventory levels, Disney et al. (2006c).  We also quantify the bullwhip 
effect in the supply chain, although we do not use this information in the objective 
function. 
 
We reveal the exact analytical expressions of the performance indicators. We highlight 
that the generalized OUT policy with unmatched controllers enable us to manipulate the 
dynamics of a supply chain with higher degree of freedom than the generalized OUT 
policy with matched controllers. Furthermore, we also discuss what kind of information 
should be shared between these two players to achieve the benefits from the altruistic 
strategy we highlight herein. 
 
We proceed by first defining the supply chain model in section 3.  Section 4 highlights 
the objective function.  Sections 5, 6 and 7 analyse three supply chain co-ordination 
schemes analytically.  Section 8 compares them numerically.  Section 9 concludes. 
 
3 DIFFERENCE EQUATION REPRESENTATION OF THE TWO-ECHELON 
SUPPLY CHAIN  
 
We assume the demand faced by the retailer is a mean centered autoregressive 
stochastic process of the first order, AR(1).  Thus, 
 
tdtdt dd    )( 1,1,1 ,        (1) 
 
and the demand faced by the manufacturer in the second echelon is the retailers order,  
 
tt od ,1,2   .          (2) 
 
In Eq (1),   is the autoregressive constant (-1<  <1), d1,t is the demand at the first 
echelon (the retailer) at time t and d  is the average demand.  We assume dd  4  so 
that the possibility of negative demand is negligible. t  is a stochastic white noise 
process.  In Eq (2), d2,t is the demand at the second echelon (the manufacturer) at time t 
and o1,t is the orders placed by the first echelon (the retailer) at time t.  It is useful to 
consider the mean centered version of AR(1) demand process as then the mean has no 
influence on the variance ratios and there is no initial transient response. 
 
We will also assume that there is a unit replenishment lead-time at each echelon.   
Additionally, there is a one period, order of events delay.   Thus at both echelons (where 
the first part of the subscript is used to indicate the echelon in question; x=1 for the 
retailer and x=2 for the manufacturer), the following inventory balance equation holds, 
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2,,1,,   txtxtxtx odnsns  ,        (3) 
 
where ns is the net stock (inventory on hand).  In each ordering policy we will also need 
two forecasts of demand.  One of these forecasts is the conditional expectation of the 
demand in the next period and this is used to generate a desired WIP (or pipeline, orders 
placed but not yet received) target.   The other forecast is the conditional expectation of 
demand in the period after the replenishment order arrives, that is, the forecast of 
demand in the next, next period.  For the retailer these forecasts are   
 
ttt ddEdwip ,11,1,1 ][           (4) 
 
 ttt ddEd ,122,1,1 ][ˆ           (5) 
 
However, these two forecasts are considerably more complex for the manufacturer.   
They are 
  
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We may use these forecasts in the following difference equation to generate orders 
(which holds at both echelons),  
    1,,,,, 11ˆ  txtxtxtxtx odwipTwnstnsTido       (8) 
 
These last few difference equations (Eqs 6-8) contain some new notation.  The first is 
tns, the target net stock, a time invariant target safety stock that is used to ensure a 
desired fill-rate or availability of stock is achieved.   The other two new terms are Ti and 
Tw.  These are linear feedback gains in the net stock and WIP feedback loops 
respectively.   Feedback gains are a very simple and very well known technique from 
the field of control theory for manipulating the response of a dynamic system.  When 
Tw=Ti=1 we say then the supply chain consists of two serially linked, “traditional” 
OUT policies; when Tw=Ti, we say there are “matched controllers; when TiTw   we 
say there are “unmatched controllers”.   
 
4 THE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
 
We will consider minimising the following objective function 
 
][][ 21 NSVarNSVarJ  .       (9) 
 
This is an appropriate objective function when there are inventory holding and backlog 
costs that are linear in the inventory position in cases when tns has been set to the 
critical fractile to minimize the costs via the newsboy principle Disney et al. (2006c). 
The fact that we have simply added the two standard deviations together also implies 
that the retailer’s inventory holding and backlog costs are as important as the 
manufacturer’s inventory holding and backlog costs. 
 
Hosoda and Disney (2006b) shows that setting Ti=Tw=1 at the manufacturer (the 
second echelon) yields a minimum value of J in a given scenario. Therefore, in our two-
echelon model, only the first echelon (the retailer) exploits the feedback controllers (Ti 
and Tw) to manipulate the dynamics of the supply chain.  The manufacturer simply uses 
a traditional order-up-to policy with MMSE forecasting to minimise J.   This is a natural 
consequence of our objective function, (Eq 9). If the objective function contains 
bullwhip related costs then this does not hold and the manufacturer should incorporate 
feedback controller(s) into his replenishment rule.  This is outside the scope of this 
paper.  However, we will quantify order variance at both echelons in our model for 
completeness. 
 
In the rest of the paper we will compare three scenarios:     The traditional, local optimisation.   This scenario considers the case when both the 
retailer and the manufacturer are solely concerned with minimising their own, local 
inventory holding and backlog costs.  We will study this scenario in section 5.  The altruistic retailer, global optimisation with matched controllers.  This scenario 
considers the case when the retailer is able and willing to alter his replenishment rule 
(by tuning Ti) in order to minimise the total supply chain costs. We assume in this 
case that the retailer uses a generalised OUT policy with matched controllers, 
Tw=Ti.  We will study this scenario in section 6.  The altruistic retailer, global optimisation with unmatched controllers. We will study 
this scenario in section 7 and is essentially the same as the previous strategy but with 
independent, unmatched controllers in the retailer’s replenishment rule, that is 
TiTw  .  
 
 
5 ANALYSIS OF THE TRADITIONAL OUT POLICY SCENARIO; THE 
LOCAL OPTIMISATION 
 
Here the retailer uses Ti=Tw=1 and thus the supply chain consists of two serially linked 
OUT policies with MMSE forecasting.   As Ti=Tw=1 there are no stability issues in the 
supply chain and the variance of the two net stock positions turns out to be 
   221 22][  NSVar         (10) 
 
          26543222 246642246642][   NSVar
           (11) 
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These expressions for the variances may, in general, be obtained by a variety of ways, 
from stochastic analysis Hosoda and Disney (2006a) via the frequency domain 
Dejonckheere et al. (2004), control theory Disney and Towill (2003), or state space 
methods Gaalman and Disney (2006).   However we will not provide further details 
here due to space requirements.  Figure 1 illustrates the inventory costs (via the standard 
deviations used in the objective function, Eq (9)) as a function of the autoregressive 
parameter,  . 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The inventory variances in the traditional supply chain 
 
The variance expressions for the demand and the two order rates are; 
   220 21 1 1][  t tDVar         (12) 
   2
2
43
1 1
112][    OVar        (13) 
     
1
111112][ 2
4322
2    OVar      (14) 
 
which have been plotted in Figure 2.  Note from Figure 2 that when 0  then a 
bullwhip effect exists as Var[O1]>Var[D1] and Var[O2]>Var[D1].   
 
 
 
Figure 2: Order variances in the traditional supply chain 
 
 
6 ANALYSIS OF THE GENERALISED OUT POLICY SCENARIO WITH 
MATCHED CONTROLLERS 
 
By setting Tw=Ti, at the retailer we have matched feedback controllers.  This yields a 
new set of variance ratio formulas.  These are: 
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From Eq (15) we can see that the valid range of Ti to ensure stability is  Ti5.0 . 
We may use these variance ratios in the objective function (Eq 9) and determine the 
value of Ti that minimises the objective function, Ti*.  Analytically this appears to be 
very difficult to achieve.  However, using numerical techniques is considerably less 
complex and results in the following graphical relationship, see Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.   The optimal Ti when matched controllers exist with an altruistic retailer 
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Using this optimal Ti inside the objective function results in Figure 4 which describes 
the minimised inventory costs in our supply chain. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.   The objective function with matched controllers at Ti=Ti* with an 
altruistic retailer 
 
The general expressions for the order variances are given by Eqs (17) and (18).  
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When Ti has been set to Ti* then the order variances can be plotted as shown in Figure 
5. Comparison of Figures 2 and 5 shows that the altruistic contribution of the retailer 
results in a smoothing of the retailers order variance.  Thus, if the retailer incurs some 
bullwhip related costs in his retail, warehousing or transportation activities, then he may 
in fact, be even more willing to use the proportional feedback controller to minimize 
costs at the supplier than this stylized analysis suggests. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.   The demand and order variances with matched controllers at Ti=Ti* 
with an altruistic retailer 
 
7 ANALYSIS OF THE GENERALISED OUT POLICY SCENARIO WITH UN-
MATCHED CONTROLLERS 
 
As there are two unmatched controllers then there is a need to conduct a stability 
analysis at the retailer.  There is no need to consider such issues at the manufacturer as 
here Ti=Tw=1 which results in a stable system.  Thus the analysis for the generalised 
OUT policy with unmatched controllers consists of a two stage approach.  
 
7.1. Stability analysis 
Stability can be readily investigated via transfer functions and we will exploit Jury’s 
Inners approach to conduct the analysis, Jury (1974). This transfer function of the 
retailers order rate is 
                zTwzzTiTw zTizTwzTizzzO 11 11 221 .      (19) 
 
It is known that stability only depends upon feedback loops and thus we may ignore the 
feed-forward autoregressive term. Setting 0  and simplifying results in 
      TwzzTiTw TwzzzO  1121         (20) 
 
Jury’s stability test requires us to expand out the denominator and collect together 
powers of z. 
    TiTwzTwTizTiTwzA 21)(       (21) 
 
The first part of Jury’s stability test is to ensure that A(1)>0 where     11  zzAA . Thus 
it follows that Tw>0. 
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The second stage of Jury’s test is that     011  An .   This is true if and only if, 
 
 TwTwTi  12 .          (22) 
 
The third and final stage of Jury’s stability test is that certain matrices of the co-efficient 
of the denominator of the systems transfer function are positive innerwise. Because our 
transfer function is only of second order, this criteria easily reduces to the fact that 
 
Tw
TwTi  1           (23) 
 
and 
 
Tw
TwTi  1 .          (24) 
 
Numerical investigation reveals that (24) is non critical as it is entirely encompassed by 
(22).   It is interesting to note that the stability bound in first step of Jury’s test results in 
Tw>0, but (23) shows us that Tw can in fact be negative.  Careful investigation shows 
that the unstable region of Tw, becomes stable when Tw<-1.   For confirmation, a more 
direct stability test is given in Disney (2008) and results in Tw>0, Eq 22 and Eq 23.  
The redundant condition produced by Jury’s Inners Test is not generated. Figure 6 
illustrates the stability region. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: The stability boundary for the generalized OUT policy with unit lead-
times 
 
 
 
7.2. Variance analysis 
 
The variance of the retailer’s net stock is given by, 
            222221 112 211][  TwTiTiTwTwTiTw TwTwTwTwTwTwTiTwTiNSVar     (25) 
 
The variance of the manufacturer’s net stock is given by, 
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Using these variance ratios in the objective function we may find the optimal values of 
the unmatched feedback controllers. Again, analytically this is very difficult, but 
numerical techniques do exist and they result in values for Ti and Tw as shown in the 
Figure 7.  Figure 7 contains some very remarkable features.  For 25734.0  both Ti* 
and Tw* are positive.  However, as there are two local optimums in the solution space 
near 25734.0 , the optimal Ti* and Tw* is discontinuous in  .   Interestingly, the 
optimal Tw* is negative for 25734.0 .  
 
 
Figure 7. Tuning the unmatched feedback controllers to minimise supply chain 
inventory costs  
 
Using these values in the objective function we may illustrate the inventory costs as 
shown in Figure 8.   Here we can see the impact of the discontinuous Ti* and Tw*.   
 
Disney, S.M. and Hosoda, T., (2009), “The benefit of altruistic behaviour achieved by the order-up-to policy with unmatched proportional feedback controllers in a two-
echelon supply chain”, International Journal of Intelligent Systems, Technologies and Applications, Vol. 6, No. 3/4, pp269–286. ISSN 1740-8865. DOI: 
10.1504/IJISTA.2009.024257. 
 
 
Figure 8.  The objective function with unmatched controllers with an altruistic 
retailer 
 
Returning now to the impact of altruistic retailer with unmatched controllers on the 
variances of the order rates we have; 
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where we have used the following substitutions as the formula is rather complex. 
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These expressions are plotted in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9.  The order variances with unmatched controllers  
(of Ti=Ti* and Tw=Tw*) at with an altruistic retailer 
 
8 NUMERICAL  INVESTIGATIONS 
 
In order to highlight the benefit of the unmatched controllers with altruistic retailer we 
will now enumerate the inventory costs and order variances for a range of values in the 
autoregressive demand parameter.  This is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Enumeration of the three supply chain scenarios 
 Traditional Supply Chain, Ti=Tw=1 Altruistic  Retailer with Matched Controllers Altruistic  Retailer with Unmatched Controllers 
  Retailers Inventory 
Cost 
Man. 
Inventory 
Cost 
Total 
Inventory 
Costs 
Tw*=Ti* 
Retailers 
Inventory 
Cost 
Man. 
Inventory 
Cost 
Total 
Inventory 
Costs 
% benefit 
above 
traditional 
supply chain 
Ti* Tw* 
Retailers 
Inventory 
Cost 
Man. 
Inventory 
Cost 
Total 
Inventory 
Costs 
% benefit 
above 
matched 
supply chain 
-1 1 1 2 99999 1 1 2 0 2.2916 1 1.210608 0.43637 1.64698 17.650818 
-0.9 1.004987 0.927826 1.93281 7.0522 1.015004 0.836012 1.85101 4.23202052 2.5032 1.0538 1.212717 0.36862 1.58134 14.568868 
-0.8 1.019803 0.901767 1.92157 5.4967 1.058742 0.703698 1.76244 8.28125428 2.2592 1.12469 1.222485 0.34969 1.57219 10.795020 
-0.7 1.044030 0.907694 1.95172 4.8776 1.115600 0.608615 1.72421 11.6568244 2.7322 1.21156 1.245786 0.35458 1.60038 7.1824312 
-0.6 1.077033 0.934631 2.01166 4.5240 1.186125 0.540233 1.72635 14.1825429 2.7945 1.30595 1.283655 0.36894 1.6526 4.2723559 
-0.5 1.118034 0.976281 2.09431 4.2717 1.266789 0.494717 1.76150 15.8910170 2.8298 1.39529 1.334536 0.38756 1.7221 2.2372178 
-0.4 1.166190 1.030543 2.19673 4.0655 1.354407 0.469610 1.82401 16.9668312 2.8380 1.46523 1.396672 0.40978 1.80646 0.9628588 
-0.3 1.220655 1.098303 2.31895 3.8898 1.446924 0.463397 1.91032 17.6215702 2.8195 1.50119 1.468354 0.43780 1.90616 0.2178938 
-0.2 1.280624 1.182294 2.46291 3.7443 1.543644 0.475552 2.01919 18.0161371 11.318 -1.9466 1.532943 0.45499 1.98794 1.5480031 
-0.1 1.345362 1.286227 2.63158 3.6294 1.644620 0.507137 2.15175 18.2335213 8.0763 -2.16987 1.68466 0.41019 2.09486 2.6443885 
0 1.414213 1.414213 2.82842 3.5414 1.749812 0.561211 2.31102 18.2929485 6.6096 -2.39687 1.8387 0.39577 2.23447 3.3125049 
0.1 1.486606 1.570484 3.05709 3.4738 1.869447 0.631878 2.50132 18.1795635 5.7847 -2.6212 1.994565 0.41342 2.40799 3.7314174 
0.2 1.562049 1.759289 3.32134 3.4201 1.970832 0.756007 2.72684 17.8994008 5.2690 -2.83001 2.153179 0.46502 2.6182 3.9840359 
0.3 1.640121 1.984940 3.62506 3.3762 2.085404 0.907326 2.99273 17.4433165 4.9208 -3.01765 2.314919 0.55435 2.86928 4.1251672 
0.4 1.720465 2.251883 3.97234 3.3394 2.202038 1.101507 3.30354 16.8364639 4.6693 -3.18779 2.479179 0.6869 3.16611 4.1602403 
0.5 1.802775 2.564786 4.36756 3.3080 2.320380 1.343665 3.66404 16.1077385 4.4777 -3.34643 2.645139 0.86864 3.51379 4.1009575 
0.6 1.886796 2.928579 4.81537 3.2805 2.440127 1.639021 4.07914 15.2890968 4.3265 -3.49769 2.812214 1.10518 3.9174 3.9651666 
0.7 1.972308 3.348462 5.32077 3.2561 2.561007 1.992942 4.55395 14.4118412 4.2041 -3.64383 2.980042 1.40206 4.38211 3.7734610 
0.8 2.059126 3.829869 5.88899 3.2340 2.682787 2.410940 5.09372 13.5043066 4.1033 -3.78616 3.148372 1.76476 4.91314 3.5453700 
0.9 2.147091 4.378447 6.52553 3.2137 2.805271 2.898642 5.70391 12.5908988 4.0187 -3.92556 3.317006 2.19882 5.51583 3.2973641 
1 2.236067 5 7.23606 3.1947 2.928303 3.461763 6.39006 11.6914462 3.9468 -4.06275 3.485779 2.70988 6.19566 3.0422908 
Average > 14.1585114 Average > 4.9103729 
 
We can see that if the retailer is able to alter his replenishment rule to incorporate 
matched feedback controllers then total supply chain inventory costs may be reduced by 
as much as 14% when compared to a traditional supply chain.   However, if the retailer 
is will to go even further and use appropriately tuned unmatched controllers, then a 
further 4.9% reduction in total supply chain inventory costs may be gained. 
 
9 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The unmatched controller generalised OUT policy dominates the matched controller 
case with an altruistic retailer who is concerned with minimising the global supply 
chain inventory costs.  The benefit appears to be approximately 5% reduction in the 
inventory holding and backlog costs.  Closer inspection reveals that the altruistic 
contribution of the retailer, in the unmatched case, is even higher than in the matched 
case.  However, the rewards are even higher when compared to the traditional supply 
chain where members are only concerned with their local inventory holding and 
backlog costs as the unmatched controller case is 18.5% better, on the average.    
 
In order to gain this advantage the first echelon needs to be able to understand the 
manufacturer’s cost structure, the demand signal and the lead-times in the supply chain 
and then alter the structure of his replenishment rules.   This is, indeed, a very complex 
task and we imagine that it will take considerable industrial engineering efforts to 
achieve. Even if this could technically be done then the manufacturer has to understand 
and use market place information and be willing to share some of the economic benefit 
with his customer.   Otherwise, the retailer will have no incentive to make the altruistic 
contribution and smooth his replenishment orders. Of course, we have also assumed a 
linear system exists, and thus all unmet demand has been backordered and the statistical 
properties of the demand signal are time invariant. 
 
As a final point, the analysis therein is very complex and rather ugly.  Recent work by 
Gaalman and Disney (2007) suggests that much more elegant results can be found by 
exploiting the “full-state-feedback” controller, a technique advocated by modern control 
theory.  This will be explored in future research. 
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